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Abstract
Selfish routing on dynamic flows over time is used to model scenarios that vary
with time in which individual agents act in their best interest. In this paper we
provide a survey of a particular dynamic model, the deterministic queuing model,
and discuss how the model can be adjusted and applied to different real-life scenarios.
We then examine how these adjustments affect the computability, optimality, and
existence of selfish routings.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic flow networks can model traffic, optical networks, building evacuations, and more. In
many of these situations individual agents using a network, road, or trying to escape a building
want to maximize their personal welfare, and thus act selfishly. In the field of algorithmic game
theory we measure the loss in quality of a solution where everyone acts selfishly compared to
some optimal solution to a given objective function. For example, how bad is it when everyone
chooses their own evacuation route from a building compared to a fire marshal directing everyone
out of the building? Already there is a great deal of research on selfish routing on flows, but
these flows have been static, meaning the model does not take into account time as a variable
and flow traverses edges instantaneously. In dynamic flows it takes time for flow to traverse an
edge, and the amount of flow, amongst other parameters, can vary with time. Only recently have
people started to study selfish routing on these dynamic flow models. In this paper we focus
on selfish routing in the deterministic queuing model and how minor changes in the model can
affect the computability, optimality, and existence of selfish routings.
The current literature surrounding selfish routing on dynamic flows is growing, but is hard to
navigate. It is very difficult to compare results from different papers which do not use consistent
terminology, keep track of the various modifications and results within a single paper, or even
abstract the results to broader instances. This paper serves to unify the current results on the
deterministic queuing model, deepen the applications of the model, apply the results to broader
categories, and provide some intuition along the way. The rest of this section presents the selfish
routing model in the context without time, and provides definitions for terms that are needed
in the rest of the paper. Section 2 presents the deterministic queuing model and the tools used
to analyze the model, and then discusses several applications of the general model. Section 3
considers ways to modify the deterministic queuing model to better fit more applications. Finally,
Section 4 appertains to the results in optimality, computability, and existence of the deterministic
queuing model and its modifications.
1.1 Static Selfish Routing
An instance of a selfish routing game is given by a directed graph G = (V,E) and a set of
source-sink vertex pairs, (s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk) called commodities. Each player i is associated with
s t
c(x) = 1
c(x) = x
Figure 1: Atomic Pigou’s Example
one commodity, and they have a specific amount of traffic
ri, also called flow, that they need to route from si to ti. In
addition each edge e ∈ E of the graph has a nonnegative,
continuous, and non-decreasing cost function ce(x), which
represents the cost of traversing the edge when there is
x amount of traffic on it [7]. Each player wants to mini-
mize their total cost of routing, and we choose an objective
function that minimizes the total cost incurred by all play-
ers. In Figure 1, we can imagine four players each wanting
to route .25 units of flow from the source s, to the sink t.
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Each player can either take the lower edge and incur a cost of one, as if they are on a super-
highway whose traversal time is independent of the amount of traffic, or they can take the upper
edge and incur a cost that equals the total amount of flow being routed on that edge. Since each
player wants to minimize their own cost, all the players will use the upper edge: if any one player
is on the lower edge, then the upper edge has total flow less than one, and thus is cheaper. In
this situation the total cost incurred by all of the players is 4 but routing two players on the top
edge and the other two players on the bottom edge minimizes the total cost of all the players, a
total cost of 3. In the field of algorithmic game theory we like to compare how bad a situation
is when everyone acts selfishly compared to some optimal solution to the problem.
1.2 Algorithmic Game Theory Basics
There are two different types of routing games. In nonatomic routing, there are a large number
of players, each controlling a negligible amount of the total overall flow. In atomic routing, each
player controls a significant amount of the overall flow. Atomic instances can either be weighted
or unweighted; in an unweighted atomic instance every player controls the same amount of
flow, whereas in weighted instances the amount of flow each player controls differs.
A Nash equilibrium is when given every other player’s strategy, no player would be better
off switching their current strategy. In the example given in Figure 1, a Nash equilibrium is all
of the players routing their flow on the top edge. To measure the inefficiency of selfish routing
we use the price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the cost of the worst Nash equilibrium
to the cost of an optimal routing. Intuitively, the price of anarchy quantifies the loss in quality
when players act selfishly instead of being forced to behave optimally. The price of anarchy for
the example in Figure 1 is 43 because, as we explained in Section 1.1, the total cost of all the
players in the Nash equilibrium is 4 but the minimal cost routing had a total cost of 3.
2 The Deterministic Queuing Model
While selfish routing on static flows is a popular research area in the algorithmic game theory
community, the model is unrealistic. Static flows do not take into account time as a variable and
the flow traverses edges instantaneously; this is where dynamic flows come in. There are many
different ways to model routing on dynamic flows, and all models incorporate time and parameter
variance over time. We specifically focus on the deterministic queueing model because it can
be modified to fit many different applications. This section presents the model, the objective
functions and prices of anarchy that are used to analyze the model, and several applications of
the model.
2.1 The Model
Vickrey introduced the deterministic queuing model [11], which Koch and Skutella later made
popular in the field of algorithmic game theory [5]. The model consists of a directed graph
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G = (V,E), a single source node s, and a single sink node t. Each edge has a non-
negative, Lebesgue integrable capacity function ue : R+ → R+, where ue(θ) bounds the
rate at which flow is able to leave edge e at time θ. If more flow particles want to leave an
edge than its capacity allows then they form a waiting queue, which has no physical dimension.
Figure 2: Waiting Queue on an Edge.
Ronald Koch. “Routing games over time”.
PhD thesis. Universita¨tsbibliothek der Tech-
nischen Universita¨t Berlin, 2012
Figure 2 serves as a visual representation of the
formation of a waiting queue. Each edge also
has a constant free flow transit time τe ∈ R+
which represents the time it takes to traverse
edge e if the waiting queue on e is empty. Play-
ers arrive at the source s at a fixed rate d, and
as soon as a flow particle arrives at the source it
determines what s− t path to take and immedi-
ately begins to route its flow on that path. Since
each player wants to arrive at their destination
t as quickly as possible, every flow particle tries
to arrive at t before the particles in front of it,
while not being overtaken by the flow particles
from behind. This results in no flow particle being overtaken, and thus the deterministic queuing
model naturally obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) property. This also implies that flow particles
never wait longer than they have to, meaning that they will always exit an edge if the capacity
allows.
2.2 Objective Functions
Dynamic flows have parameters that can vary with time and also include time as a parameter,
allowing for many different types of objective functions. This paper focuses on three particular
objective functions. Given an amount of flow M , a quickest flow sends that amount of flow from
the source to the sink in the minimal amount of time, T . An earliest arrival flow maximizes
the amount of flow that arrives at the sink for every interval [0, t], where 0 ≤ t ≤ P , where P is
some specified end time. An earliest arrival flow is also a quickest flow [1, 6]. A player’s bottleneck
value is the highest cost/latency incurred from an edge on their routing path. The bottleneck of
a flow routing is the highest bottleneck value of the players. A narrowest flow is a flow with
minimum bottleneck value [12].
2.3 Prices of Anarchy
In [4, 1], the authors describe three common prices of anarchy that are used to study selfish
routing. The evacuation price of anarchy compares the total amount of flow that has reached
the sink by some time θ in the worst equilibrium, to an earliest arrival flow. We might study
the evacuation price of anarchy if we were looking at building evacuation plans. The goal is to
have as many people exit the building at every point in time θ because we do not always know
how long we have to evacuate everyone. The evacuation price of anarchy will show us how bad it
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would be if everyone chose their own evacuation plan instead of listening to a central authority.
The total delay price of anarchy compares the total delay of the worst equilibrium to an
earliest arrival flow, where the total delay is the sum of all the players’ arrival times at the sink.
Given an amount of flow M , the completion time price of anarchy compares the amount of
time it takes to route M amount of flow from the source to the sink in the worst equilibrium to
a quickest flow.
In [12], the authors seek to minimize the bottleneck of the game. For that reason, we
introduce the bottleneck price of anarchy which compares the bottleneck value in the worst
equilibrium to the narrowest flow. When we state that a price of anarchy is bounded above by
some value x, that is saying that the price of anarchy will always be less than or equal to x. This
also means that the value of the worst equilibrium will never be more than x times the optimal
value.
2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Building Evacuations
The deterministic queuing model can be used to model building evacuations. In an emergency
we want to get as many people out of the building as fast as possible. Each individual exiting the
building wants to get out as fast as possible, and thus acts selfishly. We can imagine hallways
and stairways as the edges, and the time it takes to walk down a hallway, or down a flight of
stairs can be depicted through the free flow transit time. Similarly, every single person cannot
try to go through a doorway at the same time to exit a hallway, so people will crowd around the
doorway, i.e., form a waiting queue, until there is room for them to get through. The capacities
of the edges can thus depict the doorways.
2.4.2 Traffic Forecasting
The traffic community uses forecasting models to evaluate how changes in transportation fa-
cilities, demographics, and more impact the transportation system of a region. Before the in-
troduction of Dynamic Traffic Assignment models, transportation planning used static models.
Dynamic models are more realistic because they incorporate time into the model, and are thus
useful in evaluating travel times and costs to both players and the entire system [2]. An impor-
tant factor of the model is simulating different types of congestion. One type of congestion is a
bottleneck, in which one road segment leads into another road segment with a smaller capacity
[11]. This type of congestion can be represented through the deterministic queuing model be-
cause the edge capacities limit how many players can exit that edge, and thus replicate a smaller
amount of players being allowed onto the following edge. The use of the deterministic queuing
model in this application would be better if we made the waiting queues have physical dimen-
sion. This way, when the waiting queue reaches its physical dimension it causes longer waiting
on the incoming edges, which is what happens to roads that feed into traffic jams. Similarly, it
would be interesting to modify the model so that there were multiple edges between two vertices
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representing different lanes of traffic since not all lanes of traffic move at the same speed, and
because some lanes have better priority, such as an HOV lane.
3 Modifications of the Deterministic Queuing Model
An advantage of using the deterministic queueing model is that it is easily adapted to different
real-life applications. This section examines different model modifications and the applications
they pertain to.
3.1 Shortest Paths Networks
A simpler version of the deterministic queuing model is called a shortest paths network and only
involves slight modifications: each edge in the network has constant capacity, and each path
from the source to the sink has the same total free flow transit time, i.e., the sum of the free flow
transit times along the edges in a path from the source to the sink is the same no matter what
path you use. Instead of flow arriving at the source at a fixed rate d, all flow units are present at
the source at time 0. In the example below we consider an atomic instance of a shortest paths
network. In atomic instances there is an initial starting priority which is used for tie-breaking.
If more than one player is trying to leave an edge and the capacity doesn’t allow it, then the
player with the better priority gets to exit first [4, 5].
3.1.1 Atomic Shortest Paths Network Example
Figure 3: Atomic Shortest Paths Network
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The top left square section of Figure 3 shows a dynamic network where each edge has capacity
1. Free flow transit times are shown next to the edges, and five atomic players are shown in their
initial starting order. Each player controls one unit of flow, thus only one player at a time can
exit a given edge. We show the routing of the players at each point in time θ which results in a
Nash Equilibrium. When referring to routes we will consider the s → u → t path as the upper
path, the s → v → t path as the lower path, and the s → u → v → t path as the zig-zag path.
The green player can choose any route, all result in an earliest arrival time of θ = 3. For this
example, the green player takes the upper route. The pink player will take the lower path to
ensure an arrival time of θ = 3. The brown player could take any of the three paths for an arrival
time of θ = 4 because they must wait to exit either the (s, u) edge or the (s, v) edge because
the pink and the green player are before them in the initial starting order. In this example the
brown player takes the zig-zag path and arrives at t at θ = 4. The blue player can either take
the upper or lower path; they cannot take the zig-zag path because then the orange player could
take the lower path and enter the (v, t) edge before them causing an arrival time of θ = 6. So
the blue player will take the upper edge for an arrival time of θ = 5. Based on the blue player’s
choice of the upper edge, the orange player’s quickest route is the lower edge and experiences an
arrival time of θ = 5.
3.2 Random Queuing
Popov and Tatarenko study a nonatomic random queuing model in [10], where the network
consists of a set of parallel paths that go from the source s to the sink t. Similar to the shortest
paths network, each edge has constant capacity, and all players start at the source at time 0.
Players can either traverse an edge, or stay waiting at their current vertex (if the edge capacity
is reached) at each time step ∆t. While this may seem different than the DQM at first glance,
we can abstract the model by imagining each edge having a free flow traversal time of 1, and
instead of waiting at vertices players wait at the end of the edge leading into the vertex in which
they would have been waiting at. When the capacity of an edge is reached and a waiting queue
is formed, instead of players being allowed to exit in the normal FIFO manner players are chosen
at random. The probability that a player is able to exit the edge they are at is given by the
direct ratio of the capacity of the edge to the total amount of flow waiting to leave the edge. The
social objective of the game is to minimize the sum of the arrival costs of all the players, where
the cost of a player is their arrival time at the sink.
3.2.1 Random Early Detection
The Random Early Detection (RED) algorithm used for internet quality of service is an appli-
cation of random queues in the deterministic queuing model. If a router is too busy and cannot
deliver data efficiently, it may drop a packet. Dropping a packet serves as a signal to senders
that the network is congested and they should either reduce the bandwidth they are using or try
sending data along a different path. RED is used to drop packets before a queue becomes full.
Each queue has a minimum threshold and a maximum threshold. No packets are dropped when
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the average queue size is less than the minimum threshold, and all packets are dropped or marked
when the average queue size is larger than the maximum threshold. When the average queue size
is between the minimum and maximum threshold, packets are marked/dropped probabilistically
based on the average queue size [13]. This can be modeled by random queues in the deterministic
queuing model because when an edge reaches capacity, flow particles are chosen at random to
get to traverse to the next edge on their path. This means that there is a probability that a flow
particle might not ever get chosen to exit an edge when capacity is reached, and would only be
able to exit the edge once the amount of flow trying to exit that edge decreases below capacity,
signifying a decrease in traffic.
3.3 Atomic Games with a Bottleneck Objective
In [12], Werth, Holzhauser, and Krumke examine the deterministic queuing model under atomic
instances. In particular, they study atomic versions of the model in which players try to minimize
their bottleneck value, and the overall objective is to minimize the bottleneck of the game. Since
this is an atomic game, we need a tie-breaking scheme for when two players arrive at an edge
at the same time and the capacity will not allow them both to exit at the same time. The
tie-breaking scheme associated with this objective is a local tie-breaking scheme. In local tie-
breaking, a priority is assigned to each edge entering a vertex. If more than one player arrives at
the edge at the same time, then the players who are entering from an edge with a better priority
get to exit first. The ordering between players who were on the same edge is carried over from
the previous edges they traversed and each player is given a starting priority at the source vertex.
Another modification made in the study of atomic instances is allowing for multiple sources
and sinks. The regular deterministic queuing model is a single-commodity instance since there
is a single source and single sink. We can also consider instances in which there are multiple
commodities and each player is associated with a commodity, as described in the selfish static
routing model. While multi-commodity instances can be either nonatomic or atomic, [12] was
the only paper to consider multiple commodities in the deterministic queuing model.
3.3.1 Live Cargo Transportation
The European Union has many regulations surrounding the transportation of livestock. The
regulations center around travel times and resting periods, and at each stop the livestock must
be fed and inspected. This can be modeled through the deterministic queueing model, where
an edge represents travel between two stops. The travel time between docks can be reflected in
the free flow transit time, and the wait time reflects waiting in line to be serviced at a dock as
there are many boats that cause congestion at a dock. When there is heavy traffic at the docks,
there needs to be a way to break ties when boats arrive at the docks at the same time, and the
current tie-breaking rules are similar to local tie-breaking. An indicator of livestock health is
the time spent traveling between docks because it is a period of time that the livestock has to
go without being serviced, and travel can be hard on the animals. Thus a good objective in this
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scenario is to minimize the bottleneck value, the longest time spent traversing an edge, which in
this scenario would be the longest time the animals have to go without being serviced [12].
3.3.2 All-Optical Networks
In all-optical networks, blocking occurs when more than one data packet arrives at a node at
the same time. At each node, packets can be processed in a FIFO manner, however, sometimes
there are local priorities based on the input ports of a node. This can be modeled with the
local priority tie-breaking scheme. When blocking occurs, instead of a node dropping all but
one packet, fibre delay lines are used to allow the packets to circle around until they can be
forwarded to the next node. Packets deteriorate over time both on fibre delay lines and regular
lines between nodes. Luckily, the packet contents can be regenerated when it is finally forwarded
to the next node. Thus to ensure a good-quality routing, the objective would be to minimize the
bottleneck of the game, i.e., the maximum time spent traveling between nodes and thus time in
which the packet could deteriorate [12].
4 Results
When studying selfish models, we not only want to measure how bad a Nash equilibrium is
compared to optimal, but we want to know if a Nash equilibrium or optimal solution even exists,
and if they can be computed. Even more interesting is how small modifications to the model
or parameters affect these results on existence and computability. This section first examines
results on the three objectives discussed in Section 2.2, and the general deterministic queuing
model. It then investigates how the results change in the modified versions of the model.
4.1 Optimal Flow Results
Quickest flows on a single-commodity network are computed by doing a binary search on time.
In a multi-commodity instance computation of a quickest flow is NP-Hard and it is unclear
whether or not they always exist, but there does exist a 2-approximation algorithm for multi-
commodity instances [3, 9]. Earliest arrival flows always exist in the single-commodity instance
and there is an exponential-time algorithm to compute them, there is also a polynomial-time
approximation algorithm. While earliest arrival flows always exist in single-commodity instances,
there are multi-commodity instances in which they do not exist [9, 8]. The results are even worse
for computing a narrowest flow in the atomic instance. In the multi-commodity case, for both
weighted and unweighted players and in both cyclic and acyclic networks, computing a flow
with minimum bottleneck value is NP-complete. This result holds true even for general single-
commodity instances with weighted or unweighted players [12].
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4.2 Basic Deterministic Queuing Model and Shortest Paths Network
Koch and Skutella prove in [5] that every instance of a Nash flow in the deterministic queuing
model can be seen as a concatenation of “static thin flows with resetting”, and every instance of
a Nash flow in the shortest paths network can be seen as a concatenation of “static thin flows
without resetting”.1 Based on existence results of static thin flows shown in [4], we can conclude
that a Nash equilibrium always exists in instances of the deterministic queuing model and in
instances of shortest paths networks. Since static thin flows without resetting can be computed
in polynomial time, this means that in the nonatomic version of shortest paths network a Nash
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. This contrasts the results for an atomic
version of the shortest paths network where there is an algorithm to compute Nash, and while
the algorithm never terminates it can be stopped after exponential time and Nash can be derived
from that with rounding. In shortest paths network not only does a Nash always exist, but that
Nash is optimal (or asymptotically optimal in the atomic case). This means that the evacuation
price of anarchy, total delay price of anarchy, and time price of anarchy are all 1 (asymptotically
1 in the atomic case).
4.2.1 Stackelberg Strategy
Currently, there are no universal bounds on the price of anarchy for the general deterministic
queuing model, but Bhaskar, Fleisher, and Anshelevich generate upper bounds by enforcing a
Stackelberg strategy [1]. A Stackelberg strategy adds a player to the game that acts as a
network manager. This manager gets to route their flow ahead of all the other players, and
thus reduces the capacities of the edges, and routes their flow with the same goal as the social
objective of the game. In this model, the time price of anarchy is bounded from above by e/(e−1)
by having the network manager route an amount of flow that reduces the capacities to the same
value on each edge as the static flow underlying the quickest flow. Such a Stackelberg strategy
always exists and is polynomial-time computable. In the exact same manner, we can bound the
total delay price of anarchy from above by 2e/(e − 1) by having the network manager reduce
the capacities on each edge to the value of that edge in the static flow underlying the earliest
arrival flow. This strategy also always exists and is polynomial-time computable. Essentially,
this strategy ensures that the static flow underlying the quickest (earliest arrival) flow saturates
every edge of the graph. So if this is already the case of a given instance, then these bounds hold
without needing to use this Stackelberg strategy.
4.3 Random Queuing
In the random queuing version of the deterministic queuing model a Nash equilibrium always
exists and can be computed by nonlinear convex programming. These Nash are not unique
though, meaning that the sum of the arrival times of all the players can differ between different
Nash equilibria. Recall that in the random queuing model, each player wants to minimize their
1For more information on static thin flows, see [4].
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arrival time at the sink and the social objective of the game is to minimize C, the sum of the
arrival times of all the players. Given each player’s routing path P , we can use a global planner
to force each player to wait at the initial vertex for an amount of time equal to .5 fPamin(P )∆t
before starting their routing, where fP is the number of players using path P , and amin(P )
is the minimum capacity on path P . Such a global planner ensures that one of the Nash
equilibrium resulting from this new routing has a cost within the range [C∗, C∗ + .5∆t], where
C∗ is the minimal value of the social cost [10]. Note, that this is not a bound on the price of
anarchy because the price of anarchy looks at the ratio between the worst-valued equilibrium
and optimal, and this bound is only ensured for one resulting Nash, not all Nash equilibria.
4.4 Atomic Games with a Bottleneck Objective
We can categorize different types of instances of atomic games with a bottleneck objective in
terms of parameters such as whether players are weighted or not, whether the network is acyclic,
and whether it is a multi-commodity or single-commodity instance. We applied theorems from
[12] to broader categories of instances, to obtain the results shown in Figure 4.
Result Type of Instances
There exist instances without a
Nash Equilibrium.
Multi-commodity, cyclic or acyclic networks,
with weighted or unweighted players.
Determining whether a given in-
stance has a Nash equilibrium is
NP-Hard in the strong sense.
Multi-commodity, cyclic or acyclic networks,
with weighted or unweighted players.
Determining whether a given rout-
ing of all the players is a Nash is
Co-NP-Complete.
Multi-commodity, cyclic or acyclic networks,
with weighted or unweighted players. Single
commodity, cyclic networks, with weighted or
unweighted players.
Best Response computation is not
guaranteed to find a Nash in every
instance.
Single-commodity, cyclic or acyclic networks,
with weighted or unweighted players.
Figure 4: Results for Specific Instances of Atomic Games with a Bottleneck Objective
An interesting result from [12] is that for all instances of atomic games with a bottleneck objective,
the (bottleneck) price of anarchy is bounded from above by k, where k is the number of players.
A repercussion of players aiming to minimize their bottleneck value is that it results in an
unbounded time, evacuation, and total delay price of anarchy. This is because when players are
determining what path to take, paths with the same bottleneck value are indistinguishable to
the player, however these paths could have very different total traversal times.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents the deterministic queuing model, its variations, applications, and results.
We note that in some instances the model could be even further modified to better fit certain
applications, and one would need to study how these new modifications affect the results. There
are still gaps to be filled in the results of the deterministic queuing model and its modifications,
along with other dynamic flow over time models. Since dynamic flows include time as a variable
and parameters can vary with time, there is room to create even more models, and tailor those
models to give sufficient solutions to even more real-world problems.
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